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THE MARRIAGE PENALTY: THE WORKING
COUPLE'S DILEMMA
WENDY C. GERZOG*
INTRODUCTION

T has recently, been observed that the "Internal Revenue Code
provides an opportunity to the young to demonstrate the depth of
their unselfishness .

.

. ."I

The source of this "opportunity" is the

marriage penalty-a curious feature of the tax system whereby the tax
liability of a married couple may exceed that of a cohabiting unmarried
couple.2
The term "marriage penalty" is actually a misnomer. Marriage does
not always give rise to a tax penalty; in some cases it results in a
tax savings. For example, the tax liability of a single person with an
income of $20,000 is $3,999.3 If such a person marries someone, with
no income and the couple files a joint return, the couple's tax liability
is only $2,899. In this case, marriage produces a tax savings of $1,100.
On the other hand, if both spouses have incomes, a tax penalty results.
For instance, if each of two single persons has an income of $10,000
their combined tax liability amounts to $2,432. If these persons marry
and file a joint return, they must pay a total of $2,899 in taxes. 4 In this
case, marriage results in a tax penalty of $467. The marriage penalty,
therefore, is incurred by the marriage of two income-producing individuals.
* University Fellow and Lecturer in Law, The George Washington University. B.A. 1968,
Clark University; J.D. 1976, University of Akron; Candidate for L.L.M. (Taxation) 1979, The
George Washington University.
1. Mapes v. United States, 576 F.2d 896, 898 (Ct. Cl. 1978). This commentary proceeds as
follows: "Formerly society frowned upon cohabitation without marriage, assessing various
punitive sanctions by law and custom against the partners themselves, and their innocent
offspring. Most of these have now been eliminated in our more 'enlightened' society. Cohabitation
without marriage, and illegitimacy, or whatever it is now called, are said to be rapidly increasing.
Certainly the tax-minded young man and woman, whose relative incomes place them in the
disfavored group, will seriously consider cohabitation without marriage. Thereby they can enjoy
the blessings of love while minimizing their forced contribution to the federal fisc. They can
synthesize the forces of love and selfishness." Id.
2. See It Doesn't Pay To Wed and Work, N.Y.L.J., July 26, 1978, at 1, col. 1 [hereinafter
cited as It Doesn't Pay]. This disparity is a product of the current tax schedules which provide
different tax rates for single individuals, married couples filing jointly, married couples filing
separately, and heads of household. The rates for married persons filing separate returns are
considerably higher than those for single taxpayers. Mapes v. United States, 576 F.2d 896, 898-99
(Ct. Cl. 1978); see I.R.C. § 1(a)-(d).
3. The figures used in this Article have been derived from the rate schedules in effect for the
1977 tax year.
4. If the spouses file separate returns, their tax liability amounts to $3,002. Exercise of that

option, therefore, generally yields an even greater tax penalty.
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Generally, the marriage penalty arises when each spouse contributes
at least 20% of the couple's total income. There is, however, no
marriage penalty for a couple whose income is $5,200 or less, even if
each spouse provides 50% of the total income. The penalty is greatest
when the incomes of the two spouses are equal, and the most burdensome penalty exists when each spouse contributes $50,000. In the latter
instance, the spouses must pay roughly $6,000 more than two single
taxpayers-an additional 6% of their total income-simply because
they choose to maintain their incomes after marriage.
The marriage penalty is aggravated by the fact that a couple filing
separate returns receives only one-half the zero bracket amount of a
couple filing jointly.5 (The zero bracket amount replaces the maximum
standard deduction allowed under prior law. 6) By statute, the zero
bracket amount is $2,200 for a single individual and $3,200 for a
married couple filing a joint return. A married person filing separately,
and,
however, is permitted only $1,600 as his zero bracket amount
7
thus, is taxed on $600 more than his single counterpart.
In light of the increasing numbers of working wives, the marriage
penalty has sparked considerable controversy. 8 Despite vehement protest and extreme measures of avoidance on the part of affected
couples, 9 however, the courts have generally been unsympathetic to
those subject to the penalty. 10 Furthermore, legislative attempts to
alleviate the burden have been thwarted by deference to traditional
policies of taxation and fear of revenue losses. 1
This Article will examine the perplexing policy questions raised by
the marriage penalty. Part I will trace the origins of the penalty. Part
II will examine the deceptively complex nature of the penalty, its
potential effects on taxpayer attitudes toward work and marriage, and
its constitutionality. Part III will analyze possible solutions to the
marriage penalty and recommend one that, albeit imperfect, is preferable to the status quo.
5. See I.R.C. § 63(d).
6. See Tax Reduction and Simplification Act of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-30, § 102(d), 91 Stat.
126 (codified at I.R.C. § 63(d)). Before this revision, married persons filing separate returns were
similarly disadvantaged with respect to the maximum standard deduction and low income
allowance. See Congressional Research Service, Marital Status as a Factor in the Federal Tax

Treatment of Individuals 13-14 (1974) [hereinafter cited as Marital Status]; Richards, Discrimination Against Married Couples Under the Present Income Tax Laws, 49 Taxes 526, 527 (1971)
[hereinafter cited as Discrimination]; Rothblum, Tax Equity far Marrieds and Singles: A
Permanent Dilemma?, 4 Tax Notes 3, 4 (Aug. 23, 1976) (hereinafter cited as Tax Equity 1].

7. See I.R.C. § 63(d).
8. It Doesn't Pay, supra note 2, at 1, col. 2. Statistics show that between 1940 and 1977, the
number of working women almost doubled and the number of working wives more than tripled.
Id. at 3, col. 2.
9. See notes 65-66 infra and accompanying text.
10. See United States v. Johnson, 422 F. Supp. 958 (N.D. Ind. 1976), aff'd sub nom. Barter
v. United States, 550 F.2d 1239 (7th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 98 S.Ct. 725 (1978); Mapes v.
United States, 576 F.2d 896 (Ct. Cl. 1978).
11.

See It Doesn't Pay, supra note 2, at 3, col. 2; pt.

I1(A) infra.
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I.

HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

The marriage penalty has its origin in the relatively recent decision
to use the family as the proper unit of taxation. 12 Until 1948, the
13
federal income tax system used the individual as the taxable unit.
Each individual, whether married or single, reported all income that
he in fact received, and he was taxed without regard to marital status.
Despite the neutral nature of the tax, however, married persons had
an inherent advantage. They could reduce their tax liability by shifting
their income via interspousal gifts. In addition, married persons in
14
community property law states could effectively split their income.
This condition pressured common-law property states to adopt community property laws in order to reduce the tax burden on their
residents. To avoid an upheaval of established common-law property
concepts, Congress permitted nationwide income splitting.' s Pursuant
to the Revenue Act of 1948,16 every married couple was permitted to
aggregate the incomes and deductions of the spouses, file a joint
return, and pay twice the amount of a single individual's tax on
17
one-half of its total income.
The wisdom of Congress' response in 1948 is questionable. Income
splitting has resulted in a tremendous loss of revenue. 1 8 Moreover,
favorable tax treatment for married couples in community property
law states may not be unwarranted. Community property laws create
distinct property interests that are derived from each spouse's legal
ownership of one-half of the couple's community property. 19 True
geographical neutrality might better have been achieved by a stateby-state conversion to community property principles. Nevertheless,
Congress did not wish to activate a hasty and solely tax-motivated
overhaul of the traditional property law concepts prevailing in a great
number of states. Therefore, it permitted nationwide income splitting

12. A discussion of the penalty, therefore, necessitates a reevaluation of that decision. See
Bittker, Federal Income Taxation and the Family, 27 Stan. L. Rev. 1389, 1393-94 (1975);
Rothblum, Tax Equity Between the Married and Single: Solutions Causes Problems, 4 Tax Notes
12, 16 (Sept. 6, 1976) [hereinafter cited as Tax Equity Il].
13. Marital Status, supra note 6, at 5; Tax Equity 1, supra note 6, at 4.
14. Income splitting provides a 50-50 division of income and yields the lowest possible tax in
a progressive rate system. Tax Equity I, supra note 6, at 4.
15. See Marital Status, supra note 6, at 6; B. Okner, Income Distribution and the Federal
Income Tax 69 (1966); J. Pechman, Federal Tax Policy 92 (3d ed. 1977).
16. Revenue Act of 1948, ch. 168, 62 Stat. 110 (current version in scattered sections of
I.R.C.).
17. Id. § 301 (current version at I.RC. § 6013); Bittker, supra note 12, at 1412-13.
18. H. Groves, Federal Tax Treatment of the Family 74 (1963). It has been suggested that the
government has been paying in excess of $5.6 billion annually for its gesture in 1948. B. Okner,
supra note 15, at 70.
19. Underlying community property law is a tacit acknowledgement of the value of one
spouse's (traditionally the woman's) services in the home. Hall, The Working Woman and the
Federal Income Tax, 61 A.B.A. J. 716, 716 (1975).
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and, in so doing, substituted the family for the individual as the unit of
taxation.
Congressional rejection of the individual as the taxable unit did
more than alleviate the problems of geographical inconsistency and
income shifting through interspousal gifts. Prior to 1948, in commonlaw property states, couples with individual incomes of $6,000 and
$4,000 were taxed differently from couples with individual incomes of
$7,000 and $3,000. The 1948 reforms provided for equal tax treatment
of such couples, and thus a form of horizontal equity among married
20
couples was instituted.
Interspousal income splitting, however, subjected single taxpayers to
a greater tax liability than that of married couples with the same
income. Single taxpayers, of course, opposed this disparity, which in
some cases amounted to 41%.2 1 They claimed that the decision to
marry and to support another person was a personal one which was
already compensated through the tax system by a greater exemption
given a married couple than that afforded a single individual. 22 The
President of Single Persons Tax Reform called for the extension of
head of household rates 23 to all singles who run their own households
and the allowance of two exemptions for single householders over
the age of thirty-five. 24 She dubbed all single women over the age of
thirty-five "war single women" because they had been robbed of
potential husbands through losses in the male population due to war.
She maintained that such women should not be stigmatized further by
25
a tax system which favors married persons.
The severity of the tax burden imposed upon single persons impressed many legislators, and in the Tax Reform Act of 1969, Congress responded to the complaints by extending to all single taxpayers
the benefits of partial income splitting. 26 The rates were lowered so as
to subject the single taxpayer to no more than a 20% differential
20. Bittker, supra note 12, at 1439. For a discussion of horizontal equity principles, see pt.
II(A)(1) infra.
21. See S. Rep. No. 552, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 260(1969), reprinted in Internal Revenue Acts:
Text and Legislative History 1966-1970, at 1909 (1971).
22. Bittker, supra note 12, at 1421; Tax Equity 1. supra note 6, at 8.
23. Between 1948 and 1969, the major steps toward tax reduction consisted of the adoption
and extension of head of household status. Head of household rates were accorded to single
persons with certain qualified dependent relatives and reflected a tax burden that fell somewhere
between the rates for married couples and those for single individuals. Marital Status, supra note
6, at 7.
24. Tax Reform, 1969: Hearings Before the House Comm. on Ways and Means, 91st Cong.,
1st Sess. 1976-77 (1969) (statement of Dorothy Shinder).
25. Id. Of course, in light of the recent advances in the area of women's rights, this argument
would hardly find favor today.
26. See Tax Reform Act of 1969, Pub. L. No. 91-172. § 803, 83 Stat. 487 (codified at I.R.C. §
1(c)); Tax Treatment of Single Persons and Married Per;ons Where Both Spouses Are Working:
Hearings Before the House Comm. on Ways and Means, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 94 (1972)
[hereinafter cited as 1972 Hearings] (statement of Edwin S. Cohen).
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between his tax 27liability and that of a married couple with the same
taxable income.
Essentially, the Tax Reform Act of 1969 constituted an unsatisfactory compromise. Many single persons resented the fact that they
continued to be taxed more severely than one-earner married couples
who reported the same amounts of income but who were able to
benefit fully, and not merely partially, from the provisions of income
splitting. 28 Moreover, a new class of dissident taxpayers arose: the
two-earner married couple. 29 This group of taxpayers was unable to
use the lower rate schedules provided for single individuals when each
spouse filed a separate return. Thus, the marriage penalty came into
being: two income-producing persons sharing the same household
30
increased their tax burden by marrying and continuing to work.
I1.

A.

ANALYSIS OF THE MARRIAGE PENALTY

Attempts To Rationalize the Penalty

Several reasons have been advanced for retaining the marriage
penalty. The first is that the penalty affects only a minority of married
couples. 3 1 This argument, however, is hardly convincing. The penalty
is an inequitable tax burden that should be rectified if at all possible.
Those opposed to eliminating the marriage penalty, however, also
offer a second and more analytically complex rationale. They claim that
the penalty is the inescapable result of a progressive tax system that
adheres to the principles of (1) horizontal equity among married
couples with the same income and (2) ability to pay. This argument
merits closer analysis.
1. Horizontal Equity
According to the principle of horizontal equity, persons who are
equally situated should be equally taxed.32 The correlative of this rule
27. 1972 Hearings, supra note 26, at 75; Marital Status, supra note 6. at 8; Tax Equity 1,
supra note 6, at 5.
28. See Statements of Members of Congress on General Subjects: Tax Reform HearingsBefore
the House Comm. on Ways and Means, 94th Cong., Ist Sess. 3 (1975) [hereinafter cited as 1975
Hearings](statement of Rep. Charles E. Bennett); Hall, supra note 19, at 717; Richards, Single v.
Married Income Tax Returns Under the Tax Reform Act of 1969, 48 Taxes 301, 303 (1970)
[hereinafter cited as Single v. Married].
29. 1975 Hearings, supra note 28, at 3 (statement of Rep. Charles E. Bennett); Hall, supra
note 19, at 717.
30. 1972 Hearings, supra note 26, at 73 (statement of Edwin S. Cohen); Marital Status, supra
note 6, at 13.

31. Only about 20% of the married couples who pay taxes are subject to the marriage penalty
and, for those couples, the extra liability is less than 10% of the aggregate tax the spouses would
pay if they were single and producing the same income. 1972 Hearings, supra note 26, at 75
(statement of Edwin S. Cohen). Fuithermore, the very poor do not pay a penalty regardless of
contribution of each spouse to the couple's total income. Id. at 76.
32. See W. Klein, Policy Analysis of the Federal Income Tax 7 (1976) [hereinafter cited as
Policy Analysis].
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is that people who have equal incomes should pay equal taxes. The tax
liability of a married couple, therefore, should not differ with respect
to the proportion of income contributed by each spouse. 33 For example, a couple in which one spouse has an income of $4,000 and the
other an income of $6,000 should not be taxed differently from a
couple whose individual incomes are $3,000 and $7,000. Yet, because
of the progressive rate structure of the tax system, these couples would
be taxed differently from one another unless the spouses could aggregate their incomes and file a joint return.
As demonstrated by the testimony of former Assistant Tax Secretary
Edwin Cohen at the 1972 House Hearings on this subject, within the
framework of a progressive rate tax system it is impossible to construct
a set of rates which will not in some circumstances discomfit singles
and at other times penalize marrieds. According to Mr. Cohen, if there
is to be no penalty on single individuals, single person A with an
income of $20,000 should be taxed the same as one-earner married
couple AA whose income is also $20,000. Likewise, if there is to be no
marriage penalty, single persons BI and B 2 , each of whom has an
income of $10,000, should be taxed the same as the spouses in
two-earner couple BB, who have individual incomes of $10,000.
Lastly, if there is to be horizontal equity among married couples,
one-earner
couple AA should be taxed the same as two-earner couple
34
BB .

Clearly, all of these propositions could be accomplished if the tax
system followed a proportional rate schedule. If everyone were taxed
at a 10% rate, for example, single person A would be taxed $2,000, as
would one-earner couple AA; single persons B1 and B2 would each be
taxed $1,000, with a combined tax liability of $2,000-the same as that
of two-earner couple BB; and one-earner couple AA would pay the
same $2,000 in taxes as two-earner couple BB.
Under a progressive rate system such as the present one, however,
there is no formula that will accommodate both a marriage-neutral tax
and horizontal equity among married couples. For instance, assume
that the individuals in the example above are subject to a progressive
rate system which taxes incomes of $[0,000 at 5% and incomes of
$20,000 at 15%. Single person A and one-earner couple AA would both
be taxed $3,000. Single persons B, and B 2 would be taxed $500 each
and $1,000 in total-the same as two-earner couple BB. Thus, the tax
would be marriage-neutral: no marriage penalty and no singles' penalty. The tax, however, would not result in horizontal equity among
married couples. One-earner couple AA and two-earner couple BB,
33. 1972 Hearings, supra note 26, at 78 (statement of Edwin S. Cohen); 3 Report of the Royal
Commission on Taxation 143 (1966) [hereinafter cited as Carter Comm'n Report].
34. 1972 Hearings, supra note 26, at 78 (statement of Edwin S. Cohen).
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both of whom would report the same total income of $20,000, would
be taxed $3,000 and $1,000, respectively.
Horizontal equity, however, may not actually be achieved by taxing
one-earner couple AA equally with two-earner couple BB. 35 Horizontal
equity requires that persons similarly situated be equally taxed. But
are couples AA and BB truly similarly situated? Before proceeding
with this question, it is important to note that at the root of this
discussion is the assumption, or the recognition, that there is a
difference between a dollar earned and a dollar acquired through
investment or the earnings of another. 36 If the income of one spouse in
couple BB were derived from investments, leaving the spouse free to
stay at home, there would be little difference between the two married
couples and few complaints from taxpayers and tax analysts if the
couples were taxed similarly. 37 Arguable differences between couple
AA and couple BB would exist, however, if both spouses in couple BB
were wage earners. 38 In that event, couple BB (1) would incur greater
work-related expenses associated with the second wage earner, 39 (2)
would not enjoy the imputed income of the spouse in couple AA who
remains at home, 40 and (3) would not share in the intangible benefits of
greater leisure time and greater prestige that couple AA arguably
1

enjoys.

4

The primary benefit enjoyed by the one-earner couple under the
present tax system is that it is not taxed on the imputed income of the
35. See 1972 Hearings, supra note 26, at 150, 153 (statement of Oscar S. Gray); J. Pechman,
supra note 15, at 95; Discrimination, supra note 6, at 530; Comment, Federal Income Tax
Discrimination Between Married and Single Taxpayers, 7 U. Mich. J.L. Ref. 667, 679 (1974)
[hereinafter cited as Betz].
36. Bittker, supra note 12, at 1431 n.118.
37. H. Groves, supra note 18, at 80.
38. Congress has acceded to this differentiation to the extent that it adopted, in its 1969
legislation, a 50% maximum marginal rate on earned income. J. Pechman, supra note 15, at 100;
Hall, supra note 19, at 718. This reform, however, can hardly be viewed as more than an
inconsequential victory for proponents of the Protestant ethic who wish to see a greater
representation of their views in the tax system. As one tax-authority notes, there is little evidence
that the maximum marginal rate on earned income has served as a work incentive; essentially, it
has cost the government $500 million and has provided a subsidy for those who enjoy the very
highest income. J. Pechman, supra note 15, at 101.
39. That there are extra expenses associated with supporting a second wage earner is
undeniable; yet, this argument may be countered by the fact that all mage earners incur such
expenses and none are compensated by the present system for this cost. See H. Groves, supra
note 18, at 80; Tax Equity I, supra note 6, at 7.
40. This imputed income would consist chiefly of the household services performed by the
nonworking spouse. See Policy Analysis, supra note 32, at 588.
41. J. Pechman, supra note 15, at 99. Although certain psychological benefits might inure
to one-earner couple AA, other psychological benefits may be identified with couple BB's
situation. Intentionally or not, the recent feminist advances have belittled the role of the
homemaker, who is generally identified as the nonworking spouse. In addition, depression may
often beset the spouse who does not earn a living and who, consequently, feels little self worth.
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spouse who performs the duties of housework and, if there are
dependent children, of child care. In that respect, the one-earner couple
has a greater income than the two-earner couple with comparable
earnings and should be taxed accordingly if true horizontal equity is to
be achieved. Although imputed income in general has traditionally
been excluded from the tax base because of the difficulty in evaluating
such income, the imputed income of housework could feasibly be
calculated with reference to a standard adjustment. 42 The fact that
imputed income is not generally included in the tax base is not a
sufficient justification for according equal tax treatment to what
remain two unequally situated married couples.
This analysis reveals that the ostensible goal of preserving horizontal
equity is a feeble justification for the marriage penalty. It is apparent
that the principles of horizontal equity could better be served by
considering the distinct circumstances of various taxpayers, rather
than by taxing distinguishable married couples identically. Although
true horizontal equity may not be attained by eliminating the marriage
penalty, that goal is no more closely approximated by retaining the
penalty.
2.

Ability To Pay

Congress and the Treasury Department view income splitting together with the present rate schedules as intrinsic elements of a tax
system committed to ability-to-pay principles. 4 3 Similarly, various tax
authorities consider the marriage penalty to be an inevitable and
inextricable result of a tax policy which is formulated on the concept of
4
ability to pay.

The marital status of an individual reflects his ability to pay in
several ways. First, economies of scale are produced by the marriage
of two individuals who previously maintained separate households;
necessary living expenses are thereby reduced. 45 Clearly, the maintenance costs for a single household-one rent or house payment and one
42. This possibility was considered and rejected in one study because it seemed inequitable to
incorporate the imputed income of housework while other imputed income, which might pose
more extreme computation problems, is consistently ignored in figuring a tax base. See Carter
Comm'n Report, supra note 33, at 118-19.
43. Marital Status, supra note 6, at 1; S. Surrey, Pathways to Tax Reform 12-13 (1973). See
generally Carter Comm'n Report, supra note 33, at 14-15.
44. 1972 Hearings, supra note 26, at 78-79 (statements of Edwin S. Cohen); id. at 252
(statement of Kenneth J. White); U.S. Dep't of the Treasury, Blueprints for Basic Tax Reform
102 (1977) [hereinafter cited as Blueprints]; Bittker, supra note 12, at 1395; Tax Equity 1, supra
note 6, at 7. This concept generally implies adherence to a progressive rate structure and serves as
the goal of horizontal equity.
45. Bittker, supra note 12, at 1422-25; Tax Equity 1, supra note 6, at 7. See generally Klein,
FamilialRelationships and Economic Well-being: Family Unit Rules for a Negative Income Tax,
8 Harv. J. Legis. 361, 372 (1971) [hereinafter cited as Family Unit Rules].
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set of utility bills, for example-are less than those for two separate
homes. Incidental expenses are lower as well, since one microwave
oven and one newspaper generally suffice for one household. 4 6 Because
of the savings inherent in most marriages, it may logically be argued
that a married couple should, in fact, pay more in taxes than two
47
single persons with individual incomes one-half that of the couple,
and that the marriage penalty serves to equalize the respective abilities

to pay.
This analysis, however, is subject to criticism on the ground that
any two working persons who share living arrangements have the

same ability to pay, whatever their marital status, 4 8 and, conversely,
that the ability to pay of married persons who live apart can be

equated with that of single persons who maintain their own households. 4 9 Although a majority of married couples do live together, a
62.5% majority of single persons also share their homes with another.50 Therefore, although the present rate schedules correctly adjust

for the household economies which a significant minority of single
persons lack, they do not accurately reflect prevalent living conditions

or actual tax payment ability.5 '

Another rationalization posited for the marriage penalty is that

married persons generally pool their incomes and, therefore, have a
greater proportion of their total income available for discretionary use
than do single individuals.5 2 Despite the fact that a majority of the
single persons in this country reside with others and thus may partake

of the benefits of economies of scale, presumably very few singles
aggregate their discretionary income with that of another. Accordingly,
a married couple can more easily purchase such luxury items as
jewelry, boats, and securities than can two individual taxpayers with
the same total income. 53 It must be recognized, however, that while
Bittker, supra note 12, at 1422; Tax Equity I, supra note 6, at 7.
47. Bittker, supra note 12, at 1423.
48. See 1972 Hearings, supra note 26, at 151 (statement of Oscar S. Gray); Discrimination,
supra note 6, at 533.
49. See 1972 Hearings, supra note 26, at 151 (statement of Oscar S. Gray). See also Bitther,
supra note 12, at 1423.
50. 1972 Hearings, supra note 26, at 149 (statement of Oscar S. Gray (citing figures quoted by
Edwin S. Cohen)).
51. The Treasury Department has not been unaware of these discrepancies, but it has
regarded them as unavoidable anomalies. "There can be no question that the present system does
not provide perfect results in every instance, but the inequities generally arise from what seem to
be atypical living conditions, for example where two single people live together or because of a
particular division of income between husband and wife." Id. at 78 (statement of Edwin S.
Cohen).
52. Carter Comm'n Report, supra note 33, at 15.
53. The availability of money for discretionary use is, of course, a luxury peculiar to the
middle and upper level income groups. The marriage penalty, however, only affects those income
strata and is most severe at the upper income levels.
46.
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this rationale is generally valid, it is not consistently supportable.
Many discretionary expenses are incurred purely on an individual
basis. For example, one must still purchase the same ticket for a
theater performance regardless of one's marital status or combined
resources.
Therefore, while economies of scale and available funds for discretionary uses are proffered as justifications for the existence of the
marriage penalty, they are not compelling. The chief reason for its
retention in our tax structure is that given the family as the chosen unit
of taxation, the progressivity of the rate system, and the goal of
preserving equity among married couples with the same aggregate
income, the marriage penalty is mathematically inevitable.5 4 Elimination of the penalty, therefore, necessarily entails the abandonment of
one or more of the above characteristics of the present tax system.
B. The Penalty as a Disincentive
For some, the message of the Tax Reform Act of 1969 is clear: "If
you must work, don't marry; if you must marry, don't work; violators
will be persecuted." s Although studies are inconclusive that the
marriage penalty has had in fact more than a minimal impact on
decisions to marry and to continue to produce income,5 6 the penalty
clearly has been perceived as a disincentive. 57 The penalty may, for
instance, serve as a contributing factor in the rise of cohabitation
without marriage. 5 8 With respect to work, it is true that the marriage
penalty substantially disadvantages only those married couples in
relatively high income tax brackets and that its impact should hardly
deter such presumably self-motivated persons from pursuing their
careers. Yet, the fact remains that when two wage-earning individuals
marry and continue to work, their tax burden is likely to increase.
This fact raises an inference that the United States, perhaps unintentionally, has adopted a policy of encouraging married women to
remain in the home. 5 9 The inference is buttressed by the fact that the
marriage penalty is not the only federal statutory provision that
54.
55.
56.
Wives

See 1972 Hearings, supra note 26, at 78-79 (statement of Edwin S. Cohen).
Single v. Married, supra note 28, at 304.
See Blumberg, Sexism in the Code: A ComparativeStudy of Income Taxation of Working
and Mothers, 21 Buffalo L. Rev. 49, 88-89 (1971); It Doesn't Pay, supra note 2, at 3, col.

2.

57. "For the tax-minded young man or woman, with a substantial income, the Code adds to
the attractiveness of a prospective spouse without taxable income, and detracts from one with it."
Mapes v. United States, 576 F.2d 896, 898 (Ct. Cl. 1978). "[Tlhe elevated tax burden might in
fact dissuade some couples from entering into matrimony . . . ." Id.

at 901.

58. It Doesn't Pay, supra note 2, at 3, col. 2. Between 1970 and 1977, the number of
households shared by unrelated members of the opposite sex more than doubled. Id.
59. The penalty is viewed as a disincentive to women, who are generally the secondary wage
earners in this country. Discrimination, supra note 6, at 532.

19781

MARRIAGE PENALTY

disadvantages the working wife. Consider the present social security
laws as an example. If each spouse of a two-earner couple contributes
the maximum amount of social security taxes each year, thereby
paying twice as much as a one-earner couple, the two-earner couple
qualifies for only one and one-third, rather than twice, the amount of
benefits payable to a one-earner couple. 60 It is apparent, therefore,
that various statutes in force discourage women from entering the
61
labor force.
Taxpayers subject to the marriage penalty have resorted to extreme
and novel avoidance devices. Conscious that marital status, for pur62
poses of income taxation, is determined at the end of December,
some couples who would ordinarily incur the penalty have travelled to
an accommodating jurisdiction to obtain a divorce at the end of one
year, only to remarry at the beginning of the next. For those couples
subject to the full impact of the marriage penalty, the expenses of such
a "divorce trip" amount to less than their tax savings. 63 In response to
this increasingly prevalent merry-go-round of divorce and remarriage,
the Internal Revenue Service rendered a ruling which denies these
"sham divorces" any tax effect, that is, the couple is treated as a
married couple for the taxable year. 64 This revenue ruling has been
criticized on the ground that there are substantial nontax consequences associated with the divorce which could warrant its being
treated as other than a contrivance. 65 Furthermore, the ruling does not
necessarily remedy the tax incentive for a divorce. Couples may still
divorce in order to avoid the marriage penalty, although they may
continue to live together. They are more likely to remain divorced,
however, in order to obtain a continuing tax advantage. Rather than
nullify the effect of tax-motivated divorces, the revenue ruling may
simply encourage permanent divorce.
C. Constitutionality
The constitutionality of the marriage penalty was challenged for the
first time in Johnson v. United States. 66 The plaintiffs in that case
contended that the marriage penalty violated their fifth amendment
60. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 402(a)-(b), 402 (k)(3)(A) (1976); Economic Problems ofl omen: Hearings
Before the Joint Economic Comm., 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 414 (1973) (statement of Martha W.
Griffiths).
61. Betz, supra note 35, at 679-80.
62. See I.R.C. § 143(a)(1).
63. Feld, Divorce Tax Style, 54 Taxes 608, 609 (1976).
64. Rev. Rul. 76-255, 1976-2 I.R.B. 40.
65. Such consequences include the lapse of insurance coverage, as well as the termination of
joint ownership of property and intestacy interests when one spouse dies during the interval.
Feld, supra note 63, at 610-11.
66. 422 F. Supp. 958 (N.D. Ind. 1976), aff'd sub nor. Barter v. United States, 550 F.2d 1239
(7th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 98 S. Ct. 725 (1978).
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due process and equal protection guarantees, 6 7 as well as their fundamen-

tal right to marry. 68 The basis of the plaintiffs' due process argument
was that the income of a married couple's secondary wage earner,
which is compounded with that of the primary wage earner, is taxed at
a higher rate than that of a single individual. 69 They premised this
argument on Hoeper v. Tax Commission,70 in which the Supreme
Court struck down, as violative of due process, a state statute that
required consolidation of a husband's and -wife's separate incomes for
tax purposes. 71 The court, however, distinguished Hoeper in that there
is no federal requirement to aggregate a couple's income because the
individual spouses have the option to file separate returns. 72 Yet the
court failed to recognize that, although this option exists, the tax
system does not permit married persons filing separately to use the
lower rates provided for single individuals and that, therefore, the
option may not be a meaningful alternative.
The plaintiffs further argued that they were denied equal protection
because the marriage penalty creates a gender-based discrimination by
which married female workers-who are generally the secondary wage
earners-are taxed more severely than married male workers. 73 Rejecting this allegation, the court held that the tax laws did not incorporate
any invalid
gender-based assumptions about the sexes' earning
74
power.
Finally, the court rejected the plaintiffs' allegation that the marriage
penalty impinged on their fundamental right to marry. Although it
accepted the premise that marriage is a fundamental right protected by
the Constitution and, therefore, found the strict scrutiny test appropriate to determine the law's constitutionality, 75 the court effectively
retreated from applying that standard. Instead, it reasoned that previous violations of the fundamental right to marry had been found only
when the challenged statutes essentially proscribed that right, 76 and
held that the marriage penalty does not create such a severe marriage
disincentive that it amounts to a prohibition. 77 Throughout its deci67.

Id.

at 962-63, 968.

68. The plaintiffs claimed that their right to marry was protected by the first, fourth, fifth,
ninth and tenth amendments. Id. at 963.
69. Id. at 966.
70.
71.
72.
73.

284
Id.
422
Id.

74. Id.
invalidated
Id. at 969;
invidiously
75.

U.S. 206 (1931).
at 218.
F. Supp. at 967-68.
at 968.

at 968-69. The court also pointed out that, unlike other statutes that had been
on the basis of sex discrimination, the tax laws do not discriminate against all women.
cf. Mapes v. United States, 576 F.2d 896, 902 (Ct. Cl. 1978) (marriage penalty not
discriminatory).

422 F. Supp. at 969-71.

76. See, e.g., United States v. Kras, 409 U.S. 434, 444 (1973); Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1,
12 (1967); Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942).
77. 422 F. Supp. at 970. The plaintiffs also claimed that the tax laws violated their freedom

MARRIAGE PENALTY

1978]

sion, the court deferred to the federal government's expertise in the
contention
complex matter of taxation and accepted the Government's
78
that no reasonable alternative to the penalty exists.
The sentiments of the Johnson court were recently echoed by the
Court of Claims in Mapes v. United States. 9 The Mapes court
admitted that marriage is a fundamental right; however, it asserted
that strict scrutiny of the marriage penalty was unnecessary because
the penalty merely discourages, rather than proscribes, marriage. 80 Instead, the court held that the appropriate test was one of "minimum
rationality."8' 1 Applying that standard, the court found that the marriage penalty satisfied constitutional requisites. 82 In addition, the court
found no evidence of sex-based discrimination in the marriage penalty.
Although the penalty may affect women most severely in its application, the court stated that the relevant statute is "facially gender
83
neutral" and, therefore, is not discriminatory against women as such.
The court further found that legislative attempts to equalize the taxes
of couples with equal incomes and to tax household economies of
married persons were not unreasonable. 84 In short, the Court of
Claims left to Congress the task of dealing with the plight and the
complaints of the two-earner married couple. 85
The Johnson and Mapes decisions are not unexpected; they are
reminiscent of Kellems v. Commissioner_,86 in which the constitutional-

ity of the singles' penalty was upheld. In Kellems, the Tax Court
accepted the Government's argument that the existent tax schedule
was necessary to insure geographic uniformity and that married perof religion by discouraging marriage. The court, however, did not credit this allegation, because
it found that marriage was not proscribed by the marriage penalty. Id. at 975.
It has been suggested by one commentator that a successful challenge to the Penalty might be

based on the argument that, under the tenth amendment, the federal government may not
undermine the state's policy of encouraging the institution of marriage in an attempt to raise
revenue. See Betz, supra note 35, at 681, 684-86. The plaintiffs in Johnson, however, did not
forcefully promote this claim. If the state of Indiana had been a party in the case, this claim
might have been advanced more strongly. Of course, the court did not find the marriage penalty
to be an appreciable disincentive to marriage, and thus it is unlikely that this argument would
have elicited a different result.
78.

422 F. Supp. at 973-74.

79. 576
80. Id.
insuperable
81. Id.
82. Id.
83.

F.2d 896 (Ct. Cl. 1978).
at 901. In the words of the court, the marriage penalty "does not present an
barrier to marriage." Id.
at 904.

Id. at 901-02.

84. Id. at 904.
85. Id.
86. 58 T.C. 556 (1972), aff'd per curiam, 474 F.2d 1399 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 831
(1973). It should be noted that the tax year in question in this case was 1965, i.e., prior to the
enactment of the Tax Reform Act of 1969, which substantially alleviated the singles' penalty. See
notes 26-27 supra and accompanying text.

FORDHAM LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 47

sons have greater financial burdens than do single individuals with the
same income. 8 7 Essentially, the courts have not required that the tax
laws reflect a system of mathematically perfect justice. As long as a
class of individuals is not uniformly disadvantaged, and as long as the
Government can show that legitimate objectives are being sought, the
courts, acknowledging their own lack of expertise, will sustain the
validity of these laws. Therefore, it is clear that if the marriage penalty
is to be reduced or eliminated, it is Congress, and not the courts, which
must do so.
III.

ELIMINATING

A.

THE PENALTY

Legislative Efforts

Certainly, Congress never intended to create the marriage penalty
when it lessened the tax burden of the single taxpayer in 1969.88 Since
that time, numerous bills have been introduced in Congress in response to the complaints generated by the penalty. 89 The prototype of
these bills9" would have extended income splitting benefits to everyone
by adopting a new one-rate schedule. 9 1 A married person filing separately would have been limited to reporting only the portion of the
couple's income that he actually earned, in order to insure uniform
92
treatment of couples in community and common-law property states.
Inferentially, a one-earner couple in a community property law state
would have been required to file a joint return; otherwise, the working
spouse would have been taxed on the one-half of his income that is
actually owned by the other spouse. The proposed legislation, how87.
88.
89.
1977);

58 T.C. at 559.
Betz, supra note 35, at 690.
See, e.g., H.R. 4353, 95th Cong., 1st Sess., 123 Cong. Rec. H1661 (daily ed. Mar. 2,
H.R. 2454, 95th Cong., 1st Sess., 123 Cong. Rec. H573 (daily ed. Jan. 26, 19?7); H.R.

2452, 95th Cong., Ist Sess., 123 Cong. Rec. H573 (daily ed. Jan. 26, 1977); H.R. 2451, 95th

Cong., 1st Sess., 123 Cong. Rec. H573 (daily ed. Jan. 26, 1977); H.R. 207, 95th Cong., 1st Sess.,
123 Cong. Rec. H187 (daily ed. Jan. 6, 1977); H.R. 178, 95th Cong., 1st Sess., 123 Cong. Rec.
H186 (daily ed. Jan. 6, 1977); H.R. 10995, 94th Cong., 1:st Sess., 121 Cong. Rec. H11923 (daily
ed. Dec. 4, 1975); H.R. 5797, 94th Cong., Ist Sess., 121 Cong. Rec. 9551 (1975); H.R. 5584, 94th

Cong., 1st Sess., 121 Cong. Rec. 8998 (1975); H.R. 5407, 94th Cong., 1st Sess., 121 Cong. Rec.
8456 (1975); H.R. 4698, 94th Cong., 1st Sess., 121 Cong. Rec. 6371 (1975); H.R. 3610, 94th
Cong., 1st Sess., 121 Cong. Rec. 4035 (1975); H.R. 3254, 94th Cong., 1st Se s., 121 Cong. Rec.
3664 (1975); H.R. 2683, 94th Cong., 1st Sess., 121 Cong. Rec. 2256 (1975); H,R. 2586, 94th

Cong., 1st Sess., 121 Cong. Rec. 2150 (1975); H.R. 1177, 94th Cong., 1st Sess., 121 Cong. Rec.
509 (1975); H.R. 850, 94th Cong., 1st Sess., 121 Cong. Rec. 500 (1975); H.R. 431, 94th Cong.,

1st Sess., 121 Cong. Rec. 490(1975); H.R. 273, 94th Cong., 1st Sess., 121 Cong. Rec. 191 (1975).
90.

H.R. 715, 93d Cong.,

1st Sess., 119 Cong. Rec. 55 (1973).

91. Id. The provisions of this bill essentially represent a return to pre-1948 conditions, except
for the maintenance of present geographic neutrality.
92. See 1972 Hearings, supra note 26, at 100 (statement of Rep. Fred Schwengel). This
accommodation to geographical uniformity may pose constitutional problems. See Bittker, supra
note 12, at 1405-08 (discussing the implications of Poe v. Seaborn, 282 U.S. 101 (1930)).
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ever, was effectively smothered at the committee stage because it was
anticipated that its implementation would effect considerable revenue
93
losses.
President Carter, reportedly, had considered incorporating into his
1978 tax reform package a provision which would lessen some of the
unintended but inevitable effects of the marriage penalty. 94 Apparently, the President had contemplated proposing a deduction or a
credit which would remove part of the sting associated with this
additional tax liability, without simultaneously rejecting the principle
of horizontal equity among married couples with the same total
income. 9 S President Carter, however, decided to eliminate this pro96
posal from his tax reform package.
The recent decision in Mapes v. United States9 7 has kindled renewed interest in relieving the two-earner couple of its excess tax
burden. 98 Nevertheless, the delay in legislative action to remedy the
inequities of the marriage penalty, despite numerous proposals for
reform, indicates that developing an acceptable solution to the problem
is a troublesome task. Much of the difficulty stems from the fact that
abolition of the marriage penalty may entail a dissipation of federal
revenue9 9 and a departure from concepts upon which the current tax
system is premised.10 0 The following analysis of various proposals to
eliminate or to reduce the penalty reveals the problems involved in
formulating a workable alternative to the present system.
B. A Comparison of Possible Solutions
It is apparent from the discussion thus far that any one of the
following measures would effectively eliminate the marriage penalty:
reestablishment of the individual as the unit of taxation; adoption of a
proportional rate schedule; or taxation of married persons filing sepa93.

See It Doesn't Pay, supra note 2, at 3, col. 2.

94. Wash. Post, Dec. 1, 1977, at AlO, col. 6.
95. The President's plan was aimed at reducing, rather than eliminating, the penalty. This
indicates that he intended no overriding change in either the present taxable unit or the
established principle of income splitting for married couples.

96. President Carter's tax package did not include a marriage penalty reduction. See generally
Message from the President of the United States Transmitting Proposals for Tax Reductions and
Reform, H.R. Doc. No. 95-283, 95th Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in [1978] U.S. Code Cong. & Ad.
News 113.
97.

576 F.2d 896 (Ct. Cl. 1978), discussed at notes 79-85 supra and accompan)ing text.

98. Senator Javits and Senator Mathias have reintroduced legislation which would eliminate
the marriage penalty by reducing the tax on two-earner married couples. See It Doesn't Pay,
supra note 2, at 3, col. 2. In addition, the House Ways and Means Committee is considering a

general tax reduction for taxpayers in the $20,000-S50,000 income range which would incidentally
effect a corresponding reduction of the marriage penalty. See Wash. Post, July 29, 1978. at A6,
col. 1.
99. See note 102 infra and accompanying text.
100. See note 54 supra and accompanying text.
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rate returns at rates applicable to single individuals. 10 ' Less ideally,
the penalty could be reduced by instituting a deduction or a credit for
the two-earner married couple or by extending an earned income

allowance to all members of the labor force. Concededly, none of the
foregoing proposals are flawless. For instance, all entail potential losses
of federal revenue' 02-a feature which invites political opposition, but
which should not sustain an inequitable taxation policy. Therefore, a
solution to the marriage penalty must rest on the least objectionable
alternative to the status quo.
1. The Individual as the Tax Unit
Substitution of the individual for the family as the taxable unit
would remove the factor of marriage from tax computations,10 3 eliminate the inequity of taxing single persons at a higher rate than married
couples with the same total income,10 4 recognize the economic disparities between one- and two-earner couples,105 and underscore some
101. The fact that the present tax system does not address itself to household sharing realities
has spawned an additional proposal. Our present tax policy attributes to the marital state certain
economies which actually are derived from the sharing of household expenses by more than one

person-whether they be related by affinity, consanguinity, or not at all. 1972 Hearings, supra
note 26, at 251-52 (statement of Kenneth J. White); Single v. Married, supra note 28, at 304. In
light of this attitude, it has been suggested: (1) that a one-rate schedule be adopted and a limited
deduction for housing expenses be allowed, Discrimination,supra note 6, at 536; or (2) that the
present rates be continued, but that those singles who actually maintain their own households be
permitted to claim head of household status. Marital Status, supra note 6, at 17. Although
theoretically more consistent with ability-to-pay concepts than the current tax system, these
proposals have been criticized as impractical and possibly unconstitutional in their Invasion of
privacy. 1972 Hearings, supra note 26, at 77 (statement of Edwin S. Cohen); Family Unit Rules,

supra note 45, at 388 n.36. It would be difficult, indeed, to verify who lives with whom, and it
would be nearly impossible to set a particular date on which to determine the status of an
individual's living accommodations. Concededly, a proportion of days, or months, during which a
taxpayer lived singly or with others could be ascertained in order to assess tax liability. Yet,
roommates frequently change residences during the course of a year, and the number of
household-sharing individuals could vary constantly so that calculations of a person's living
expense deductions could be exceedingly complex. Basically, this system would create a nightmare for the Internal Revenue Service.
102. See 1972 Hearings, supra note 26, at 90-91 (statement of Edwin S. Cohen) (marrieds
taxed at singles' rates would result in an estimated loss of $3.7 billion); Policy Analysis, supra note
32, at 10 (proportional tax); J. Pechman, supra note 15, at 97 (deduction or credit); id. at 100
(earned income allowance). Admittedly, replacement of the family with the individual as the
taxable unit could result in either a revenue loss or gain, depending upon which alternative plan
is implemented. See note 107 infra and accompanying text. On the one hand, if income splitting
were extended to all individuals, a loss in revenue would result. Hall, supra note 19, at 717. On
the other hand, if all income splitting were eliminated, there would be a revenue gain. See 1972
Hearings, supra note 26, at 90 (statement of Edwin S. Cohen).
103. 1972 Hearings, supra note 26, at 30 (statement of Rep. Robert K. Gray); id. at 252
(statement of Kenneth J. White); Blueprints, supra note 44, at 103.
104. 1975 Hearings, supra note 28, at 3-4 (statement of Charles E. Bennett).
105. 1972 Hearings, supra note 26, at 153 (statement of Oscar S. Gray).
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feminist goals, particularly that of preserving a woman's individual
identity. 10 6 In practice, use of the individual as the taxable unit would
entail either the extension of income splitting to all individuals or the
elimination of income splitting entirely. 0 7 Presumably, each individual-regardless of marital status or manner of filing-would be entitled to the same zero bracket amount. 0 8
There is, however, no overwhelming support for this change in the
tax unit. 10 9 Undoubtedly, an attempt to eliminate income splitting
would raise a vigorous dissent from the one-earner married couple, for
whom the present system provides a distinct tax advantage. Adoption
of the individual as the tax base would also revive several problems
which existed prior to 1948.110 For instance, the concept of ability to
pay could be weakened,"' and income shifting through interspousal
gifts could become unmanageable. Although property transfers primarily motivated by tax avoidance might be disallowed, distinguishing
bona fide transactions from tax manipulations could present difficulties. 112 Also, the allocation of deductions between two spouses would
3
pose renewed problems."1
106.

See Menzies, The Uncounted Hours: The Perception of Women in Policy Formation, 21

McGill L.J. 615, 623 (1975).
107. J. Pechman, supra note 15, at 95. Either plan would conceivably require only one rate
schedule. See 1972 Hearings, supra note 26, at 228 (statement of Louise H. Jones); Single v.
Married, supra note 28, at 304; Betz, supra note 35, at 688. Alternatively, a two-rate schedule
with a table for marrieds filing separately containing bracket widths one-half as large as those
used for individual returns could be employed. See H. Groves, supra note 18, at 57, 83 (including
an explanation of the Pechman Plan). Additionally, the demise of income splitting would simplify
the identification of taxpayers. Blueprints, supra note 44, at 103.
108.

Cf. Nussbaum, The Tax Structure and DiscriminationAgainst Working Wires, 25 Nat'l

Tax J. 183, 191 (1972) (stating that, under prior law, each taxpayer would receive the scame low
income allowance or maximum standard deduction). For a discussion of zero bracket amounts,
see notes 5-6 supra and accompanying text.
109. Even some advocates of the proposal agree that its adoption is unlikely. Hall, supra note
19, at 717; Betz, supra note 35, at 688.

110. It has been suggested that pre-1948 geographical disparities could be avoided by
mandating the use of joint returns by married couples or by requiring that married persons filing
separately report only the amount of income they themselves actually earned during the taxable
year. See 1972 Hearings,supra note 26, at 148 (statement of Oscar S. Gray); Hall, supra note 19,
at 717 (disallow all joint returns and limit each spouse to reporting only the income he actually
earned); Discrimination,supra note 6, at 536. In addition, it may be possible to maintain some of
the differentiation in tax burden based on family size through the allowance of personal
exemptions. 1972 Hearings, supra note 26, at 174 (statement of Seymour Halpern); J. Pechman,

supra note 15, at 95; 1 S. Surrey, W. Warren, P. McDaniel & H. Ault, Federal Income Taxation
1280-83 (1972); Betz, supra note 35, at 691. Other pre- 1948 problems, however, would necessarily
reemerge.
111. See Carter Comm'n Report, supra note 33, at 122; Bittker, supra note 12, at 1419; Tax
Equity I, supra note 6, at 7.
112. Carter Comm'n Report, supra note 33, at 120-21.
113. It has been suggested that this problem could be resolved by according to each spouse his

proportionate deductible share. Such calculations, however, necessitate taking marriage into

FORDHAM LAW REVIEW

[Vol, 47

Most importantly, however, after almost thirty years of income
splitting, the family holds a secure position as the accepted unit of
taxation. 114 It is unrealistic to anticipate legislative rejection of a
prevalent social theory-that the family unit best represents society's
economic relationships' '--merely because adherence to that theory
occasions the marriage penalty.

2. A Proportional Tax System
The adoption of a proportional tax system would eliminate a basic
element of present tax policy-progressivity.

Although conversion

from a progressive to a proportional tax would quiet complaints of
discrimination based on marital status, 1 6 so fundamental a change in
policy would constitute a rather visionary cure for the marriage
117
penalty, which affects a relatively small percentage of taxpayers.

Moreover, a change to a proportional rate schedule would probably
occasion a general tax increment which would be especially unpopular
with middle and lower income taxpayers who would reap little or no
benefit from the conversion."18
3.

The Use of Singles' Schedules by

Married Persons Filing Separately
Perhaps the easiest means of eliminating the marriage penalty would
be to grant married persons filing separately the privilege of using

singles' schedules.

119

Two basic plans have been offered to implement

such a system. One proposal would allow a couple to continue to

compute its taxes under the present system and then to deduct the
difference between the amount that it would owe under the current tax
laws and the amount that the spouses would have to pay were they
still single. 120 Alternatively, it has been suggested that married persons
account. See Tax Equity 11, supra note 12, at 13. More importantly, they would undermine the
alleged simplicity inherent in a one-rate schedule.
114. Bittker, supra note 12, at 1428; Betz, supra note 35, at 688; see note 109 supra and
accompanying text.
115. See Carter Comm'n Report, supra note 33, at 122.
116. 1972 Hearings, supra note 26, at 105 (statement of John C. Davidson); H. Groves, supra
note 18, at 56; The Tax Structure and Discrimination Against Working Wives: A Comment, 26
Nat'l Tax J. 119, 121 (1973).
117. See note 31 supra.
118. See Policy Analysis, supra note 32, at 36.
119. See 1972 Hearings, supra note 26, at 228 (statement of Louise H. Jones); Haworth, Tax
Incentives for Getting or Staying Unmarried, 4 Tax Adviser 128 (1973); Single v. Married, supra
note 28, at 304. In order to avoid the pre-1948 advantages of living in community property law
states, the option could be accorded only to those spouses who earn substantial amounts of
income of their own. Married persons with less than the requisite earnings would continue to be
permitted to file separately, but they would be limited to using the rate schedules presently in effect
for marrieds filing separate returns.
120. 1972 Hearings, supra note 26, at 147-48, 152 (statement of Oscar S. Gray).
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filing separately could simply use the rates presently applicable to
single individuals.1 2 1 To accord such an option to married taxpayers
would equalize the secondary earner's work incentive with that of his
single counterpart, eliminate the marriage disincentive associated with

the economic differences between onethe penalty, 122 and recognize
123
and two-earner couples.
The principal drawback of this proposal is that it would necessitate
an abandonment of the principle that all married couples with equal

incomes should pay the same tax, regardless of each spouse's contribution to the couple's total income. 1 24 Although this factor would not
entail as radical an alteration of present tax policies as either of the
proposals discussed above, 125 implementation of such a plan may

incite a protest from those who maintain that married couples with
equal incomes are similarly situated and, therefore, should be taxed
equally.

4.

Deduction or Credit for the Two-Earner Couple

Tax authorities who wish to retain the basic features of the present
system suggest that the marriage penalty could be reduced, although
not eliminated, by allowing a deduction or a credit for the couple With
two wage-earning spouses. 126 Such a measure would compensate for
the understatement of income by the one-earner married couple1 27 and
for the extra
expenses associated with having a second worker in the
8

family.

12

121. Id. at 44 (statement of Florence B. Donohue), 147 (statement of Oscar S. Gray).
One model bill submitted by the New York Women's Bar Association during the 1972 Hearings
delineates this solution by limiting the application of singles' schedules to those spouses who earn
at least 80% of their individual income or who derive at least 80% of their income from pensions
associated with former employment, and by restricting claims of head of household status to one
spouse who would then be able to deduct child care expenses. Id. at 44 (statement of Florence B.
Donohue). Another provision of this bill would permit married wage earners who elect to file
separately under singles' schedules to have the lesser amounts withheld from their paychecks in
the following year. Id. at 45 (statement of Florence B. Donohue). The restrictions imposed under
this plan would obviate inequitable taxation of the investment income of one-earner and
two-earner families by limiting the applicability of singles' rates to earned income.
122. Bittker, supra note 12, at 1437-38.
123. 1972 Hearings, supra note 26, at 153 (statement of Oscar S. Gray).
124. See notes 34-35 supra and accompanying text.
125. See notes 109-17 supra and accompanying text.
126. Marital Status, supra note 6, at. 16-17; H. Groves, supra note 18, at 17; Bittker, supra
note 12, at 1434; Nussbaum, supra note 108, at 191; Discrimination, supra note 6, at 536; Tax
Equity II, supra note 12, at 14.
127. J. Pechman, supra note 15, at 95; Tax Equity II, supra note 12, at 14.
128. Bittker, supra note 12, at 1431; Tax Equity 1I, supra note 12, at 14. Although all taxes
are work disincentives and all workers incur nondeductible extra expenses, id. at .15, because
even the first dollar of the secondary wage earner's income is taxed at the primary spouse's
marginal rate, the secondary earner has less disposable income than an unmarried worker wvith
which to defray such work-related costs. Blumberg, supra note 56, at 62.
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Generally, proponents of this solution impose a specific upper limit

for the deduction or credit so as to restrict its benefits to those families
in the low and middle income levels. 12 9 One such plan, for instance,
calls for the taxation of only 75% of the wage income of the secondary
worker in a two-earner family. 130 This feature would be confined to
secondary incomes of $10,000 or less, that is, the maximum exclusion
or deduction from gross income would be $2,500 regardless of the
amount of the secondary worker's earnings. 13 1 Under this proposal,
the marriage penalty would be diminished, as compared with present
law, for all married persons with incomes less than $100,000; above
32

that income stratum, however, the penalty would be aggravated.
Moreover, all higher income couples, including one-earner couples
with incomes of $30,000 or more, would be subject to the penalty.

Therefore, implementation of this plan would diminish the value of

income splitting-a benefit presently available to all one-earner
couples.1

33

This plan has been criticized on the ground that it would address
problems of employment rather than marriage, 134 yet fail to aid the
single wage earner who also incurs work-related expenses, 135 even if
he has a second job.13 6 In addition, it has been suggested that such a
137
plan may be politically unfeasible.

129. H. Groves, supra note 18, at 82.
130. See Blueprints, supra note 44, at 104-06.
131. Id.
132. Id. at 176.
133. See Hall, supra note 19, at 717-18. This plan, which was proposed by the Tieasury
Department under William A. Simon, is consistent with the goals espoused in Canada's Carter
Comm'n Report, supra note 33. The Carter Commission recommended that there be no marriage
penalty at the bottom of the income scale, since low income couples suffer from certain
diseconomies associated with marriage and have less money available for discretionary use than
their middle and upper income counterparts. Id. at 15-16. Although the Carter Commission
suggested a tax credit-which is of greater benefit than a deduction to low income taxpayersand would limit this credit to low income families, the Simon plan is substantially analogous to,
and reflective of, the findings of that study. The Simon proposal would also lessen the marked
differentiation between one- and two-earner married couples.
134. Tax Equity 11, supra note 12, at 15.
135. H. Groves, supra note 18, at 80; Tax Equity II, supra note 12, at 15.
136. See generally Tax Equity I, supra note 6, at 7.
137. See Hall, supra note 19, at 717-18. A dependent care deduction or credit, on the other
hand, is almost universally favored, see, e.g., Blueprints, supra note 44, at 105; H. Groves, supra
note 18, at 17; Blumberg, supra note 56, at 95; Hall, supra note 19, at 718, although it has been
criticized by those who view the expenses associated with child care as concomitant to the
decision to have children. Klein, Tax Deductions for Family Care Expenses, 14 B.C. Indus. &
Com. L. Rev. 917, 918, 938, 941 (1973). The present credit is particularly popular, as It Is
available for even those persons who do not itemize their deductions. See I.R.C, § 44A; 121
Cong. Rec. 7992 (1975) (remarks of Sen. Tunney); LaRue & Sapp, The New Creditfor Child and
Dependent Care Expenses, 55 Taxes 373 (1977). The legislative intent in enacting this credit,
comparable to the arguments for reducing the marriage penalty, was to remove the severe work
disincentive for working mothers. 121 Cong. Rec. 7992 (1975) (remarks of Sen. Tunney). A

MARRIAGE PENALTY
5.

A General Earned Incomp Allowance

Reduction of the marriage penalty could also be effected by extending an earned income allowance to all wage earners. Unlike the
deduction or credit, the earned income allowance would promote
relatively consistent tax treatment of single workers with one or more
jobs and their married counterparts. 138 Nevertheless, such an allowance would foster many of the same problems presented by a deduction or credit 1 39 and would generate substantially greater revenue

losses. 140 Since most income tax revenue is derived from earnings, it is
probable that the rate schedules would have to be increased to such an
extent that, ultimately, no wage earner would be in a better position
than he was without the allowance. 14 1 Essentially, an earned income
allowance would complicate the tax return 14 2 without achieving noticeable gains.
C. The Preferable Solution
Among the several imperfect means of alleviating the marriage
penalty, the least objectionable and most effective measure would be
to permit married persons filing separate returns the option of using
the rate schedules available to single taxpayers. This plan would not
effect a total upheaval of the present tax structure, as would rejection
43
of the family as the taxable unit or adoption of a proportional tax. 1 It
would merely require a reevaluation of the assumption that married
couples having the same total income should pay equal amounts in
taxes. As demonstrated above, however, this assumption incorrectly
ignores the actual economic distinctions between one-earner and twoearner couples with comparable incomes. 144 Therefore, it is not a
cogent justification for maintaining an inequitable tax structure.
The proposal could easily be implemented; it would require no
change in the present rate schedules and could be effected by means of
a single statutory provision. Moreover, it would provide a complete,
rather than a partial, remedy for the two-earner couple.
It should be noted that to permit some married taxpayers to take
advantage of singles' rates would not have an adverse impact on other
taxpayers. The tax liability of the one-earner couple--although it may
dependent care deduction or credit, however, can only effect a partial remedy for the marriage
penalty because not all married couples have dependent children or other qualifying relatives.
138. An earned income allowance has been justified on the ground that earned income differs
from unearned income. An individual whose income is earned has less ability to pay than does a
person whose income is derived from investments. The former must incur the expenses of earning
a living, only a few of which are presently deductible. See I.R.C. § 262. Furthermore, he does
not enjoy the luxury of the latter's leisure time. J. Pechman, supra note 15, at 99.
139. See notes 132-37 supra and accompanying text.
140. J. Pechman, supra note 15, at i00; Bittker, supra note 12, at 1442.
141.

Bittker, supra note 12, at 1442.

142.

J. Pechman, supra note 15, at 100.

143.

See notes 109-17 supra and accompanying tex*

144.

See notes 35-42 supra and accompanying text.
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exceed that of some two-earner couples under the proposed systemwould be no greater than it is at present. Moreover, one-earner couples
would continue to benefit from income splitting and to enjoy the
untaxed imputed income of the spouse who remains at home, available
for full time housework. Similarly, equalization of the tax rates of
single individuals and secondary wage earners of two-earner couples
would not place unmarried taxpayers in a less favorable position than
they currently enjoy. Although the adoption of such a plan would
create distinctions among two-earner couples whose spouses contribute
in different proportions to the same total income, such couples could
determine whether filing jointly or separately would benefit their
particular circumstances and act accordingly. In any event, no taxpayer would be taxed more heavily than he is at present.
Under the proposed plan, the income tax laws would assume a
neutral attitude toward the working wife. Although such a step might
appear to disregard the economies of scale traditionally attributed to
marriage, such economies are neither exclusively nor uniformly present
in the marital relationship. 145 Moreover, even if this measure were
viewed as an incentive to the married woman worker, such affirmative
action is not reprehensible in light of the historic and current legislative
146
penalties imposed for that status.
CONCLUSION

The historical product of the Tax Reform Act of 1969,1 4 7 the
marriage penalty is an unavoidable result of a tax system based on
precepts of ability to pay, rate progressivity, and horizontal equity
among married couples with the same income. 48 Its elimination must
rest upon a legislative reevaluation of these features, because any
solution, despite its deceptive appearance of simplicity, will alter one
or more of these fundamental policy decisions.
It is suggested that the simplest and most satisfying alternative to
the present system is to afford married persons filing separately the
opportunity to utilize the tax rates presently applicable to single
individuals. This measure would effectively eliminate the penalty, but
would not entail a corresponding alteration of fundamental tax principles and policies. It would simply reject the questionable assumption
that all married couples with equal incomes are similarly situated and,
therefore, should be equally taxed. This proposal represents a feasible
and easily implemented alternative to the marriage penalty. As such, it
merits serious and prompt consideration by legislators who seek to
quell the legitimate complaints of the two-earner couple without
adversely affecting the rights of other taxpayers.
145.

See notes 48-53 supra and accompanying text.

146. See notes 59-61 supra and accompanying text. Under this proposal, married women
would be encouraged to take better paying and more prestigious jobs, since the marriage penalty
would be eliminated even for the highest salaried employment.
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